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CAMPAIGN 'FINANCE REFORM IN THE STATES 
The Watergate revelations brought to the attention of most 
Americans for th'e first time the significant campaign financing 
abuses made possible by weak laws and lax enforcement. Illegal 
contributions from corporations and labor unions were stock-
piled in secret slush funds. Hundreds of thousan:ds of doTlars 
were secretly diverted from legitimate campaign purposes to be· 
used for illegal activities •. · 
The problem of wealthy interests buying special access or 
government favors through large secret campaign contributions 
shown by· the Watergate disclosures exists not just on the federal 
level but in state and local campaigns as wel,l. Special inter-
ests don't contribute to political campaigns out of ·a sense of 
civic duty. In the words of Jesse Unruh, former Speaker of the 
California House, 11 Money is the mother's milk of politics ... 
Robert A. Weinerman, the Connecticut Public Works Commissioner, 
in endorsing public financing of elections, recently admitted 
that the awarding of state contracts is sometimes influenced by 
political donations. 11 I'm a strong advocate of having elections 
paid for by ~he government, .. Weinerman said, 11 but until that 
happens the Democratic Party has a right to survive, too. I 
can't be unmindful of the party's responsibility to itself." 
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The corrupting influence of special interest contributions 
has been well documented but the equally important issue of com-
petition in American political carr' .aigns has been largely ignored. 
But the concept of competitive elections is at the very heart 
of our system of democracy. It is an essential ingredient in 
the accountability equation. Yet in looking at the record it 
becomes clear that competition is missing from today's political 
scene. For example: 
In the United States House of Representatives, 98 percent 
of those incumbents who ran for re-election in 1968 were re-elected. 
In 197.0 and 1972 the figure was 96 percent. ln 19__74 1 tb.e yea,r 
of Watergate, it dropped only slightly to 89 percent. 
-- In November of 1972, 19 incumbent State Senators stood 
for re-election in California and 19 were re-elected. In 1974, 
incumbent Senators were 14 for 16, and 60 of the 66 incumbent 
Assemblymen who ran were re-elected. 
-- In Massachusetts, 151 out of 280 legislators ran unop-
posed in the 1974 general election. Thirty-three of the 41 
committee chairmen got a free ride at the polls. 
--. In such diverse states as Arizona, Wisconsin, Delaware, 
and Texas, we have checked and the figures are similar. Incumbent 
state legislators are regularly re-elected at rates in excess 
of 90 percent. 
Why is this? 
One could argue that incumbents are being re-elected in 
record numbers because the people approve of what they are doing. 
The public record hardly seems to justify such a position. We 
are in what can only be described as a massive political 
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depression. In 1973, pollster Louis Harris found "a full-blown 
crisis of confidence." Only 24 percent of those polled expressed 
high confidence in state government. Seventy-four percent 
believed that "special interests get more from government than 
the people do." 
And things have gotten worse over the last two years. In 
1975, Harris told the National Conference of Mayors that "con-
fidence in government at all levels in this country has hit 
rock bottom." Those who expressed high confidence in state 
government, for example, fell to 16 percent. The level of voter 
participation at the polls, to use another indicator, has plum-
meted. 
This is not a constituency that re-elects incumbents simply 
because it is content with their performance. Common Cause 
believes that a major reason for incumbents' success is linked 
to the huge advantage they have in obtaining political financing. 
In the states, as on the federal level, campaign dollars 
flow to incumbents and act to stifle competit~on. California 
Common Cause found that in their 1972 state legislative elections 
incumbents were able to outspend challengers by a factor of 
almost.two to one. 
In New Jersey in 1973, Common Cause found that 75 percent 
of contributions from lobbyists went to incumbents. Challengers 
received only eight percent with the rest going to candidates in 
open races. 
California Common Cause also found that few average citizens 
contribute to campaigns. The money came from economic interest 
groups with special interests in certain matters before the 
' 
legislature. In California in 1972: 
-- The Insurancemen's Political Action Committee gave to 
29 California Assemblymen; 14 of these were on the 15-member 
Assembly Finance and Insurance Committee. 
-- The California Life Underwriters' Political Action 
Committee contributed to 13 Assermlymen, nine of whom were on 
the Finance and Insurance Committee. 
-- The California Medical Association's Political Action 
Committee gave to 78 of the 87 incumbent legislators but to only 
four challengers. 
-- The California Title Insurance Committee contributed to 
61 of the 87 incumbents but to no challengers. 
The facts are similar in other states: 
-- The Baltimore Evening Sun found that 90 percent of those 
who contributed over $1,000 to the incumbent Maryland Governor's 
1970 re-election campaign had direct financial interests in 
governmental decisions -- contractors, engineers, racetrack 
owners, insurance executives, and so on. 
The Miami Herald found that of the $2~7 million in 
reported contributions for the 1972 Florida legislative elections, 
one out of every two dollars was funneled in by lobbyists and 
four ~pecial interest groups with vital stakes in upcoming 
legislation. In 1974, the pattern was the same. 
Common Cause Proposals. 
To remedy the unhealthy influence of money in politics and 
to restore competition in political campaigns, Common Cause 
supports a program of full and timely disclosure of campaign 
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finances, limitations on contributions and expenditures, a 
mixed system of public and private financing of campaigns, 
and strict enforcement. Common Cause believes that each state 
should enact comprehensive campaign finance legislation th.at 
includes the following basic principles: 
Full and tirilel:(: disclosure of campaign finances. The 
voters have a right to know the major financial supporters of 
all candidates. Therefore, it is essential that all candidates for 
el~ctiy~ o:f;tice and their controlled committees file statements 
that include the full name, address, occupation, and employer's 
name of each contributor of $50 or more. In order to complete 
the picture, information on each expenditure of $50 or more must 
be disclosed also. 
This information, as valuable as it may be, is virtually 
useless unless it is available to the voters in advance of the 
election. Campaign finance statements should be filed twice 
before both the primary and general elections, with at least one 
final statement filed after election day. 
-- Limits on contributions by individuals and groups. In 
order to reduce the influence of large contributors, Common 
Cause favors limitations on the amount that individuals and 
groups may contribute. The Common Cause proposal prohibits 
contributions from corporate funds o+ union dues but allows 
corporations or unions to pool voluntary contributions. 
Limits on expenditures high enough to ensure competitive 
races. Common Cause believes that the amount of money that a 
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candidate's committee may spend should be limited. However, the
 
danger in imposing expenditure limits is that they may be set 
so low as to prevent challengers from adequately presenting 
their positions to the voters, thereby virtually assuring re-
election of the incumbent. 
Common Cause believes that each candidate must be allowed 
to spend enough money to insure the candidate the opportunity 
to communicate fully with the voters about the issues in his 
or her candidacy. This amount will vary from state to state, 
and should be arrived at only after a thorough analysis of what 
candidates must spend in order to run an open and competitive 
race. 
In addition to imposing expenditure limits on candidates, 
Common Cause recognizes that individuals and groups not control-
led by the candidate, while they have the right to express their
 
own views about the different candidates, must be placed under 
spending limits. 
-- A mixed system of public and private financing for primary 
and general elections for state offices. The fact is, we already
 
have public fin~ncing of elections in the form of higher prices 
and wages, costlier roads and buildings, and inadequate returns 
on the investment of state funds. The special interest contribu
-
tors merely pass the costs along to the consumer and taxpayer. 
Common Cause believes that it is well past time for state gov-
ernments to establish a neutral channel tbrough which to provide
 
public dollars for elections. 
The cost of the old system is far too high -- both in taxpayer 
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dollars, and in lack of citizen confidence in government. The 
cost of public financing is comparatively low. Common Cause/ 
. 
Massachusetts determined that its comprehensive public financing 
bill would cost each taxpayer only $1.54 each year. That is a 
small amount to pay, even at a time of economic recession, to 
help pull us out of a political depression. 
Under the Common Cause proposal, public money to finance 
these campaigns will come from a voluntary income tax check-off 
system. In order to make sure that frivolous candidates do not 
receive tax dollars, primary candidates must qualify for public 
funds by raising a certain amount of private dollars from small 
contributions. After qualification to receive funds in the 
primary, additional small contributions are matched by public 
funds. In the general election, major party nominees receive 
direct grants of public funds of up to 75 percent of the ex-
penditure limit. There are special provisions for minor party 
candidates·and.independents based on demonstrated public support. 
Tough sanctions enforced by an independent enforcement 
commission. While the goal of campaign finance laws is dis-
closure rather than criminal convictions, only strong administra-
tion backed up by tough penalties will ensure meaningful disclosure. 
Knowing violation of the law should be a criminal offense. The 
law should be enforced by an independent commission with members 
who are not otherwise public officials and with a full time 
staff and strong enforcement powers. Citizens should be able 
to sue to enforce the law where the appropriate officials do not. 
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Progress in the States 
When the voters of Washington State overwhelmingly approved 
Initiative 276 with 72 percent of the vote in November of 1972, 
they touched off a wave of campaign finance reform that has 
reached nearly every state. Since that time, over 40 states 
have enacted significant new campaign finance laws. 
Louisiana, Michigan, and Tennessee enacted laws in 1975 
requiring pre-election disclosure for the first time. This 
leaves only seven states that do not require candidates to file 
disclosure reports before elections -- Alabama; Indiana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. (North 
Dakota does not even require post-election reporting.) Twenty 
states now require disclosure reports at least twice before 
every election -- Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washington. 
As.a result of 1975 legislative action, 31 states now 
limit the amount that candidates may spend in campaigns. 
Twenty-two states now limit the amount individuals may con-
tribute to campaigns. 
Independent enforcement commissions were established 
in Georgia, Maine, Michigan, and Montana in 1975. More than 
one-half of the state'S nowhave such commissions to enforce 
campaign financing ~aws. 
Idaho, Michigan, and North Carolina enacted public financing 
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laws with dollar checkoffs in 1975. This brings'the total to 
eight -- Iowa, Minnesbta, Montana, Rhode Island, and Utah are 
the others. These five states reported between 20 and 25 
percent participation by taxpayers in 1975. In Maine, however, 
where public financing is funded by a tax surcharge (i.e., an 
added tax liability), participation has been just above one 
percent. Maryland also has a surcharge and Massachusetts 
enacted one in 1975. New Jersey provides for public financing 
of the gubernatorial election from the general fund. In 1975, 
the Oregon legislature enacted a public financing law and made 
it subject to voter approval in 1976. 
Campaign Financing Reference Materials 
(1) Common Cause Model State Campaign Finance Reform Act; 
(2) Common Cause et al, Brief for the Appellees in the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Buckley v. Valeo (October 
201 1975); 
(3) Common Cause, "The Case for Public Financing of Political 
Campaigns" (Wertheimer speech, August 26, 1975); 
(4} Common Cause Memorandum: Public Funding of State Campaigns 
Through the Use of Income Tax Deduction, Credit, Check-
off and Surcharge (May 1975); 
(S) Campaign Practices Report, "Campaign Practices Legislation 
in the 50 States" (2814 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20007); 
(6) Federal Election Commission, "Analysis of Federal and State 
Campaign Finance Law: Summaries" and: "Quick-Reference 
Charts" (June 1975) (1325 K Street, N.W., Washington, 
D.C. 20463); 
(7) National Association of Attorneys General, "Legislative 
Approaches to Campaign Finance, Open Meetings and 
Conflict of Interest" (1516 Glenwood Avenue, Raleigh, 
North Carolina 27608) (December 1974); 
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Ethics Clearinghouse 
The National Conference on Government, a service of the 
National Municipal League, is headquarters for a new clearing-
house of information on ethics. lobbying disclosure, and campaign 
financing. Contact: William J.D. Boyd, National Municipal 
League, 47 ~ast 68th Street, New York, New York 10021. 
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